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ARIZONA CHRISTIAN SCHOOL TUITION 
ORGANIZATION V. WINN: RELIGION STOLE 
THE MONEY FROM THE TAXPAYER JAR—
NO STANDING, THEN WHO? 
Elleny Christopoulos* 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment protects against 
government-established religion. This protection is meaningless, 
however, if those protected are unable to challenge Establishment 
Clause violations because they lack standing. In Flast v. Cohen in 1968, 
the U.S. Supreme Court created an exception that allowed for taxpayer 
standing in certain cases. But in Arizona Christian School Tuition 
Organization v. Winn, the Court narrowed the doctrine by finding that 
some taxpayers did not have standing to challenge a law that granted 
tax credits to people who contributed to scholarship organizations, 
which included religious schools. The Court reasoned that the tax 
credits in Arizona Christian were different from the government 
expenditures in Flast; therefore, the Court held that the Flast exception 
did not apply. This Comment examines the Court’s ruling in Arizona 
Christian and argues that it should have allowed standing to maintain 
the integrity of the First Amendment and the freedom from government-
established religion. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A well-known riddle poses the question: if a tree falls in the 
woods with no one around to hear, does it make a noise? Likewise, if 
the government spends money on religion and no one has standing to 
bring a lawsuit, is there a constitutional violation? In the federal 
judicial system, a lack of standing makes the case nonjusticiable, and 
the case cannot be heard on its merits.1 If strict standing limitations 
restrict a citizen’s ability to challenge constitutional violations, then 
who will be able to challenge those violations? This Comment 
focuses on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona Christian 
School Tuition Organization v. Winn,2 which narrowed the definition 
of standing, thereby restricting a citizen’s access to federal courts in 
the Establishment Clause context.3 
Arizona Christian was a challenge to an Arizona law that 
granted tax credits to those who contributed money to organizations 
that provided scholarships to students attending private schools, 
including religious schools.4 The Court addressed only the issue of 
standing in the case, deciding whether Arizona taxpayers had 
standing to challenge an alleged violation of the Establishment 
Clause.5 The Court found that the plaintiffs did not have standing in 
the case for two reasons: (1) the plaintiffs did not meet the general 
requirements for standing;6 and (2) the plaintiffs did not meet the 
exception to the general rule against standing because government 
expenditures are different from tax credits.7 
In deciding Arizona Christian, the Court made a clear distinction 
between government expenditures and tax credits, holding that 
plaintiffs who challenge government expenditures for religious 
purposes have standing, whereas plaintiffs who challenge tax credits 
for religious purposes do not.8 This Comment argues that this 
distinction is inappropriate because tax credits for religious purposes 
 
 1. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 2. 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). 
 3. See id. 
 4. Id. at 1440. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 1444–45. 
 7. Id. at 1447. 
 8. Id. 
  
Winter 2012] ARIZONA CHRISTIAN 539 
cause the same harm to the taxpayer that government expenditures 
do. Accordingly, the Court should have found standing in this case. 
Part II of this Comment gives a brief history of the standing 
doctrine and the Establishment Clause. Part III discusses Arizona 
Christian and its factual background. Part IV explains the reasoning 
of the Court. Part V discusses the potential negative effect of Arizona 
Christian on future Establishment Clause cases, asserting that if 
taxpayers do not have standing to challenge Establishment Clause 
violations such as this, no one will have the ability to challenge such 
violations. Finally, Part VI concludes by arguing that the Court 
should have decided Arizona Christian differently in order to 
maintain the integrity of the First Amendment and the freedom from 
government-established religion. 
II.  HISTORICAL  
FRAMEWORK 
In order to fully understand the nature of the Court’s decision in 
Arizona Christian, it is necessary to first understand the background 
principles of the standing doctrine. Accordingly, this section 
discusses: (1) standing in general; (2) taxpayer standing; and (3) 
exceptions to the general standing requirement. 
A.  Standing in General 
Article III of the Constitution mandates that federal courts rule 
only on cases or controversies.9 Although Article III does not use the 
term “standing” in its language,10 the Court has historically 
interpreted this mandate to mean that plaintiffs must first establish 
standing in order to bring a case in federal court.11 The Court’s 
interpretation came from the English legal tradition requiring “the 
need to redress an injury resulting from a specific dispute.”12 As part 
of the system of checks and balances between the branches of the 
government, the standing requirement acts as a restriction on the 
federal judiciary.13 The judiciary does not have the power to question 
the constitutionality of acts of the legislative or executive branches 
 
 9. Id. at 1442; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750–51 (1984). 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 11. See Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1442. 
 12. Id. at 1441. 
 13. Id. at 1442. 
  
540 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:537 
unless there is an actual case or controversy brought before it.14 This 
limit is said to “maintain the public’s confidence in an unelected . . . 
judiciary” and give legitimacy to judicial decrees.15 
According to the Court’s interpretation of Article III, standing 
has three basic requirements: (1) the plaintiff must suffer an actual 
particularized injury; (2) “there must be a causal connection between 
the injury and the conduct complained of”; and (3) it must be likely 
that the injury can be redressed by a court decision.16 The party who 
brings the claim bears the burden of establishing these elements.17 
The injury must be actual or imminent and not hypothetical.18 The 
causal connection between the injury and the conduct cannot be “too 
attenuated.”19 As to redressability, “a plaintiff satisfies the . . . 
requirement when he shows that a favorable decision will relieve a 
discrete injury to himself. He need not show that a favorable decision 
will relieve his every injury.”20 All three of these requirements must 
be satisfied for a plaintiff to establish standing under Article III.21 
Too much speculation regarding any of these requirements suggests 
that a plaintiff will not have standing to bring a case.22 
B.  Taxpayer Standing 
Taxpayer standing is analyzed as a separate, extremely limited 
category. The general concept that standing cannot be based only on 
a plaintiff’s taxpayer status dates back to 1923’s Frothingham v. 
Mellon
23 case.24 There, a taxpayer alleged that certain federal 
expenditures exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority.25 The 
 
 14. See id.; see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992). 
 15. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1442. 
 16. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
 17. Id. at 561; FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990). 
 18. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
 19. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984). 
 20. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 243 n.15 (1982). 
 21. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
 22. Id. 
 23. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
 24. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1443 (2011); Hein v. 
Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 599–600 (2007); Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 
487. 
 25. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 479–80. The plaintiff in Frothingham brought an action 
challenging the “Maternity Act,” which appropriated federal funds to the states to help reduce 
maternal and infant mortality. Id. at 479. The plaintiff alleged that the act was a usurpation of 
power that the Constitution had not granted Congress and was therefore unconstitutional. Id. 
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taxpayer claimed injury based on her potential increase in tax 
liability due to Congress’s unconstitutional spending.26 
The Court rejected the taxpayer’s argument because the alleged 
injury was too “remote, fluctuating and uncertain” to constitute a 
case or controversy under Article III.27 Because millions of other 
taxpayers shared the taxpayer’s interest in how the government spent 
her money, the Court found  that the issue was not for the judiciary to 
decide but rather a matter of public concern to be resolved through 
the political system.28 Thus, the Court held that the taxpayer did not 
have standing.29 Since Frothingham, it has been nearly impossible 
for a plaintiff to have standing based on taxpayer status alone 
without meeting an exception to the taxpayer-standing rule.30 
C.  Exception to the Rule— 
Establishment Clause Standing 
The Court created an important exception to the taxpayer-
standing rule in Flast v. Cohen31 in 1968.32 There, it allowed 
taxpayer standing where taxpayers challenged an alleged violation of 
the Establishment Clause.33 Specifically, the taxpayers challenged a 
federal statute that allowed government expenditures to financially 
support, among other things, the purchase of textbooks and other 
instructional material in religious schools.34 The Court held that the 
taxpayers had standing, and it created a two-part test to determine 
when standing exists simply based on the plaintiff’s status as a 
taxpayer.35 
The first part of the test requires that a plaintiff show a “logical 
link” between his or her taxpayer status and the “type of legislative 
enactment attacked.”36 In Flast, this link existed because the 
taxpayers alleged that the government collected and spent tax dollars 
 
 26. Id. at 477. 
 27. Id. at 487. 
 28. Id. at 487–89. 
 29. Id. at 488. 
 30. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1443 (2011). 
 31. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
 32. Id. at 102. 
 33. Id. at 85–88. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 102–03. 
 36. Id. at 102. 
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on religious schools.37 The second part of the test requires that there 
be a “nexus” between the taxpayer status and the “precise nature of 
the constitutional infringement alleged.”38 In Flast, the taxpayers met 
this condition because the complaint alleged that the government had 
violated the Establishment Clause, unlike in other cases where 
taxpayers did not allege a constitutional violation.39 
The Flast Court found support for this exception to taxpayer 
standing by looking at the nation’s history, particularly the writings 
of James Madison.40 The Madisonian view was that a taxpayer 
should not have to contribute any amount of his property—not even 
“three pence”—to religious purposes.41 Turning to Flast, the injury 
was not monetary from any increase in taxes as a result of the law 
but rather that the “conscience would be violated if citizens were 
required to pay taxes to support religious institutions with whose 
beliefs they disagreed.”42 Flast was significant because it was the 
first successful taxpayer standing case.43 However, since Flast, the 
Court has been unwilling to find this exception to the general 
taxpayer-standing rule outside the context of Establishment Clause 
claims.44 
 
 37. Id. at 103; cf. Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952) (finding no standing in an 
Establishment Clause case where the plaintiff sued when federal funds were used for recitation of 
Bible cases in public school because it involved at most an incidental expenditure of tax funds). 
 38. Flast, 392 U.S. at 102. 
 39. Id. at 103. Compare the constitutional challenge in Flast, where a specific constitutional 
clause was challenged, to the nonspecific challenge in Frothingham. See supra note 25 and 
accompanying text. 
 40. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1446 (2011); Flast, 392 U.S. 
at 103. 
 41. Flast, 392 U.S. at 103 (quoting 2 JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance 
Against Religious Assessments, in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 186 (Gaillard Hunt 
ed., 1901)). 
 42. Noah Feldman, Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 
351 (2002). 
 43. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 85, 106. 
 44. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1445; Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 
U.S. 587, 609 (2007) (“[This Court has] declined to lower the taxpayer standing bar in suits 
alleging violations of any constitutional provision apart from the Establishment Clause.”). 
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III.  STATEMENT OF  
THE CASE 
A.  Factual Background 
Arizona Christian was a challenge to an Arizona law that 
provides tax credits for contributions to school tuition organizations 
(STOs).45 These STOs use the contributed funds to give scholarships 
to students attending private schools.46 Many of the private schools 
that receive scholarship money are religious schools.47 Respondents 
in this case, a group of Arizona taxpayers (“the taxpayers”), 
challenged the tax credits, alleging that government support of these 
religious schools through tax credits is a violation of the 
Establishment Clause under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.48 
Specifically, the taxpayers challenged section 43-1089 of the 
Arizona Tax Code.49 The statute allows for tax exemptions by 
granting Arizona taxpayers dollar-for-dollar tax credits for 
contributions to designated STOs.50 Taxpayers are allowed a 
maximum credit of $500 per person and $1,000 per married couple.51 
Further, taxpayers may carry forward the credit for five years if the 
credit exceeds the individual’s tax liability.52 Section 43-1089 sets 
out various conditions that an entity must meet in order to qualify as 
an STO, including: (1) “[t]he organization was required to be exempt 
from federal taxation under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986”; (2) “[i]t could not limit its scholarships to students only 
attending one school”; and (3) it had to distribute “‘at least ninety 
percent of its annual revenue for educational scholarships or tuition 
grants’ to children attending qualified schools.”53 A “qualified 
school” is “defined in part as a private school in Arizona that [does] 
not discriminate on the basis of race, color, handicap, familial status, 
 
 45. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1440. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1089 (2010); Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1440. 
 50. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1440 (citing § 43-1089(A)). 
 51. Id. (citing § 43-1089(A)). 
 52. Id. (citing § 43-1089(D)). 
 53. Id. (citing § 43-1089(G)(3)). 
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or national origin.”54 This definition does not include discrimination 
on the basis of religion or gender.55 
The taxpayers “alleged that § 43-1089 allows STOs ‘to use State 
income-tax revenues to pay tuition for students at religious schools’ 
[that] ‘discriminate on the basis of religion in selecting students.’”56 
Specifically, the taxpayers alleged that Arizona’s STO tax credits 
had an estimated annual value of more than $50 million.57 The 
taxpayers claimed that they had standing to challenge Arizona’s law 
based on their status as Arizona taxpayers.58 
B.  Procedural History 
Originally, the taxpayers brought their case in state court and 
challenged the law by invoking both the U.S. Constitution and the 
Arizona Constitution.59 On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court 
rejected the claim on its merits without addressing the taxpayers’ 
standing.60 After the Arizona Supreme Court ruled, the U.S. Supreme 
Court denied certiorari of that case.61 
Next, the taxpayers filed their action in the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Arizona.62 Challenging the law as a violation of the 
First Amendment, as incorporated against the states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the taxpayers requested an injunction 
preventing the state from allowing religious STOs to claim the tax 
credit.63 The district court held that the Tax Injunction Act 
jurisdictionally barred the case.64 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed that decision 
in Hibbs v. Winn.65 
On remand to the district court, the Arizona Christian School 
Organization and other interested parties intervened.66 Again, the 
 
 54. § 43-1089(G)(2); Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1441. 
 55. See Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1441. 
 56. Id. (quoting Complaint at 125a–26a, Winn v. Killian, No. CIV 00-0287 (D. Ariz. Feb. 
15, 2000)). 
 57. Id. at 1444. 
 58. Id. at 1440. 
 59. Id. at 1441. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. An injunction was only one of several remedies that the taxpayers requested. Id. 
 64. Id. The Tax Injunction Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). 
 65. 542 U.S. 88 (2004). 
 66. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1441. 
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district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim.67 The 
Ninth Circuit reversed the decision, finding that the taxpayers had 
standing under the Flast exception.68 The Ninth Circuit denied en 
banc review,69 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.70 
IV.  REASONING OF  
THE COURT 
The Court held in a 5–4 decision that the taxpayers lacked 
standing to bring the case.71 The Court reasoned that the claimed 
harm is only speculative because taxpayers are not required to 
contribute any of their property to the establishment of religion.72 
Because the taxpayers lacked standing to bring their action, the Court 
dismissed the case, which could not be heard on its merits.73 
A.  Majority Opinion 
In arriving at this decision, the Court relied on Article III of the 
Constitution, which gives the federal judiciary the power to resolve 
“cases” and “controversies.”74 First, the Court rejected the idea that 
the taxpayers had standing generally as taxpayers.75 The Court 
maintained its general position that an individual who has paid taxes 
does not have a “continuing, legally cognizable interest in ensuring 
that those funds are not used by the Government in a way that 
violates the Constitution.”76 The Court reasoned that claims of 
taxpayer standing “rest on unjustifiable economic and political 
speculation.”77 
Here, the Court found similar problems with the taxpayers’ 
claim because the injury to the taxpayer was too speculative.78 In 
essence, proof of injury to a taxpayer requires two inferential steps: 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Winn v. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org., 586 F.3d 649, 658 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 70. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1436. 
 71. Id. at 1449. 
 72. Id. at 1447. 
 73. See id. at 1449. 
 74. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity . . . .”); Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1449. 
 75. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1444–45. 
 76. Id. at 1442–43 (quoting Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 599 
(2007)). 
 77. Id. at 1443. 
 78. See id. at 1444. 
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(1) injury to the state from an increased burden; and (2) injury to the 
taxpayer based on taxes that were raised to make up a deficit.79 Even 
if the Court had accepted the taxpayers’ claim that Arizona’s STO 
credits were valued at $50 million a year (it neither accepted nor 
rejected this claim),80 the Court still would not have found the injury 
that is required for taxpayer standing.81 The injury might be 
speculative or nonexistent because the education of children is one of 
the state’s principle missions and responsibilities.82 By helping 
students obtain scholarships to private schools, the STO program 
may have lessened the burden on Arizona’s public schools.83 If the 
average cost of an STO scholarship is less than the average cost of 
educating an Arizona public school student is, then the STO tax 
credit may in fact not cause any financial loss to the state.84 
Regardless, even if the STO credits did have negative effects on 
Arizona’s budget, the Court concluded that further speculation would 
be required to find injury-in-fact to the taxpayer.85 To show injury, 
the taxpayers would have had to demonstrate that Arizona 
lawmakers would actually raise the taxpayers’ taxes in response to 
any deficit that the STO program caused.86 No facts supported such a 
finding here.87 Furthermore, the Court determined that finding 
causation in this situation was too speculative, stating that “the 
inferential steps to show causation and redressability depends on 
premises as to which there remains considerable doubt.”88 In sum, 
because of the speculation that is involved in finding actual injury, 
causation, and redressability, the Court did not find general taxpayer 
standing here.89 
Second, the Court analyzed standing under the Flast exception, 
which was the taxpayers’ main argument.90 Although the taxpayers 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. The Court acknowledged the Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization’s 
assertion that studies indicated that the STO program may actually save the state money. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1443–45. 
 90. Id. at 1445. 
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claimed—and the Ninth Circuit agreed91—that their case fell under 
the exception to the general standing rule in Flast, the Court 
disagreed.92 Instead, the Court narrowed the Flast decision by 
creating a clear distinction between government tax credits and 
government expenditures93: challengers of government expenditures 
have standing and challengers of tax credits do not.94 Thus, the Flast 
Court dealt with a government expenditure of tax funds for religion 
and allowed taxpayer standing, while the Court in this case did not 
allow standing because a tax credit is not the same as a government 
expenditure.95 
The Court recognized that tax credits and expenditures can have 
“similar economic consequences,” yet it still distinguished them.96 
Government expenditures with taxpayer money cause a dissenter to 
“know[] that he has in some small measure been made to contribute 
to an establishment in violation of conscience.”97 In this situation, the 
Court recognized that there would be an injury to the taxpayer, even 
if no additional tax liability were imposed on the individual.98 In 
contrast, when the government does not impose a tax, there is “no 
connection between [the] dissenting taxpayer and [the] alleged 
establishment.”99 Tax credits here are distinguished from government 
expenditures because Arizona taxpayers themselves choose whether 
 
 91. Id. at 1441. 
 92. Id. at 1447. 
 93. Tax credits are one form of tax expenditures. Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a 
Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government 
Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 706 (1970). Tax expenditures are “monetary subsidies the 
government bestows on particular individuals or organizations by granting them preferential tax 
treatment.” Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1452 n.1 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[D]efining ‘tax 
expenditure’ for the purposes of the federal government’s budgetary process as ‘those revenue 
losses attributable to provisions of the . . . tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or 
deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a 
deferral of tax liability.’” (citing 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (2006))). Tax expenditures are found within 
the Internal Revenue Code and, therefore, they receive less congressional and popular scrutiny 
than direct appropriations do. Bernard Wolfman, Tax Expenditures: From Idea to Ideology, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 491, 493 (1985). In contrast, government expenditures are a form of direct 
government financial assistance, which includes direct grants, loans, interest subsidies, guarantees 
of loan repayment or interest payments, and insurance on investments. Surrey, supra, at 713. 
 94. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1447. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968)). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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or not to contribute to STOs,100 unlike cases where the government 
collects money from taxpayers for religious purposes.101 The Court 
found that because taxpayers can choose whether or not to contribute 
to STOs, tax credits are sufficiently distinguishable from expenditure 
cases.102 The Court held that the tax credit here was not “tantamount 
to a religious tax or to a tithe and does not visit the injury identified 
in Flast.”103 Thus, the taxpayers neither met the general taxpayer- 
standing rule nor the Flast exception, and the Court dismissed the 
case for lack of standing.104 
B.  Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Kagan authored the dissent in Arizona Christian.105 First, 
the dissent agreed with the majority that there was no standing under 
the general taxpayer-standing rule.106 However, the dissent disagreed 
with the majority by finding that the case did fit within the Flast 
standing exception.107 Primarily, the dissent was not persuaded by 
the majority’s finding that there is a distinction between a tax credit 
and an expenditure, stating that the distinction “has as little basis in 
principle as it has in our precedent.”108 
The dissent explained how the taxpayers clearly had standing 
under the Flast decision.109 First, the taxpayers challenged a 
provision under the Arizona Tax Code that the legislature enacted 
under its taxing and spending powers—satisfying part one of the 
Flast test,110 which requires a “logical link” between taxpayer status 
and the “type of legislative enactment attacked.”111 Second, the 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 1449. Justice Scalia wrote a short concurrence in which Justice Thomas joined. Id. 
(Scalia, J., concurring). The concurrence agreed that there was no standing in this case, and went 
further to reject the Flast standing exception. Id. at 1449–50 (“Flast is an anomaly in our 
jurisprudence, irreconcilable with the Article III restrictions on federal judicial power that our 
opinions have established. I would repudiate that misguided decision and enforce the 
Constitution.”). 
 105. Id. at 1450 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Joining Justice Kagan were Justice Ginsburg, Justice 
Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1451. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1450. 
 109. Id. at 1451–52. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968). 
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taxpayers alleged that the Arizona tax provision violated the 
Establishment Clause—satisfying part two of the test,112 which 
requires a “nexus” between taxpayer status and the “precise nature of 
the constitutional infringement alleged.”113 In order to show that this 
case challenged a law under the tax power, the dissent pointed to the 
Court’s ruling on another issue in Hibbs, where it stated that the 
claim challenged “an integral part of the State’s tax statute.”114 
Next, the dissent explained why the majority’s reasoning was 
flawed in distinguishing tax credits and government expenditures.115 
It noted that Flast was decided more than forty years ago, and since 
then not one court, including the U.S. Supreme Court, has 
distinguished between the two for the purposes of standing.116 In 
other cases, the Court has recognized that “[t]ax breaks ‘can be 
viewed as a form of government spending.’”117 
In addition to this strong precedent, the dissent provided logical 
reasons for not distinguishing between tax credits and 
expenditures.118 Although they differ, tax credits and expenditures 
are both ways in which the government can monetarily support an 
organization.119 As the dissent pointed out, “the distinction is one in 
 
 112. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1451–52 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 113. Flast, 392 U.S. at 102. 
 114. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1452 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 
U.S. 88, 119 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). 
 115. Id. The dissent also points out that even on the majority’s own terms, standing should 
result in this case. Id. at 1458 n.9. Arizona’s tax credit program “in fact necessitates the direct 
expenditure of funds from the state treasury.” Id. at 1458–59 n.9. Presumably, activities to 
support the STO program cost money, which comes from the state treasury. Id. at 1459 n.9. Thus, 
the government has “extract[ed] and spen[t]” the taxpayers’ money to implement the tax credit 
program. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1455. The Court specifically noted five Supreme Court cases involving similar 
facts and where standing was found: Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 
(1970); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Committee for Public Education & Religious 
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); and Hibbs v. 
Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004). Id. at 1453. Although standing was not the issue in these cases, every 
federal court has an independent obligation to consider standing even if the parties do not 
question it. Id. at 1454. The dissent noted that these cases are significant because they suggest 
that the taxpayers should have standing here as well, based on this precedent. Id. 
 117. Id. at 1456 (quoting Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 
564, 589–90 n.22 (1997)); see also Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 236 
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Our opinions have long recognized . . . the reality that [tax 
expenditures] are ‘a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system’ . . . .”). 
 118. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1455. 
 119. Additional sources suggest that there is little to no difference between tax credits and 
government expenditures. See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 
3 (1985) (explaining that tax expenditures “represent government spending for favored activities 
or groups, effected through the tax system rather than through direct grants, loans, or other forms 
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search of a difference.”120 If the government cannot support religious 
causes through direct spending, the obvious alternative would be to 
offer tax credits that cannot be challenged due to lack of standing.121 
The dissent used several hypothetical examples to make this 
point, such as a tax credit of $500 that rewards members of the 
Jewish faith for their religious devotion in lieu of receiving an annual 
stipend, or a tax credit that subsidizes the ownership of crucifixes.122 
Here, for example, the government would be directly giving a 
member of the Jewish faith money for their religious devotion, which 
would allow a taxpayer to challenge an alleged Establishment Clause 
violation.123 In contrast, using the majority’s logic,124 no standing 
would be allowed if the government was to give a tax credit, rather 
than make a direct expenditure, for the same purpose. The dissent 
used these examples to help show why the majority’s reasoning was 
not sound in distinguishing between government expenditures and 
tax credits for Establishment Clause standing.125 
V.  ANALYSIS: THE FUTURE  
OF ESTABLISHMENT  
CLAUSE STANDING 
Arizona Christian sets a dangerous precedent for the future of 
Establishment Clause cases. In the words of Justice Kagan, it 
“devastates taxpayer standing.”126 By calling the injury to taxpayers 
“speculative” at best when the government monetarily supports 
religion through tax credits, the Court has narrowed Flast’s taxpayer-
standing exception and significantly limited challenges to violations 
 
of government assistance”); David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and 
Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 972 (2004) (“[A]ny government program can be 
implemented through a direct expenditure or through the tax system.”); Erskine Bowles & Alan 
Simpson, A Real Budget Deal? Yes, We Still Can, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2011, at A19 (referring 
to “tax expenditures” as “the various deductions, credits and loopholes that are just spending by 
another name,” in their roles as cochairmen of the National Commission of Fiscal Responsibility 
and Reform).  
 120. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1455 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 121. See id. 
 122. Id. at 1457. 
 123. See id. at 1447. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. at 1457 (“The effect of each form of subsidy is the same, on the public fisc and 
on those who contribute to it. Regardless of which mechanism the State uses, taxpayers have an 
identical stake in ensuring that the State’s exercise of its taxing and spending power complies 
with the Constitution.”). 
 126. Id. at 1462. 
  
Winter 2012] ARIZONA CHRISTIAN 551 
of the Establishment Clause.127 However, in the words of James 
Madison, government should not “force a citizen to contribute three 
pence only of his property for the support of any one 
establishment.”128 Yes, the Court was technically correct that the 
taxpayer is not directly forced to contribute his property to support 
religion.129 However, what significance, if any, does the 
Establishment Clause have if the government can so easily get 
around this prohibition by using tax credits to support religion? With 
no taxpayer standing for challenging religion-related tax credits, who 
can challenge these laws as constitutional violations? In Arizona 
Christian, the tax credits from the STO program amounted to 
approximately $50 million per year.130 Using the majority’s logic, 
there is essentially no limit on financial governmental support of 
religion, as long as it is in the form of tax credits.131 
The Flast opinion posed a hypothetical that questioned whether 
a taxpayer would have standing to challenge government spending 
for the building of a church.132 This question demonstrated the great 
need for an exception to the taxpayer-standing rule for Establishment 
Clause cases.133 The Court’s answer made clear that taxpayers must 
be able to challenge this impermissible governmental support of 
religion.134 Likewise, if the question was whether a taxpayer would 
have standing to challenge a tax credit for those who give money to 
build a church, the answer should still be the same—because in both 
instances, the effect of the subsidy on the taxpayer is the same.135 
The answer here should be clear, too—that the taxpayer must be 
 
 127. See id. at 1447. 
 128. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968) (quoting 2 JAMES MADISON, Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 186 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901)). 
 129. See Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1447 (“A dissenter whose tax dollars are ‘extracted and 
spent’ knows that he has in some small measure been made to contribute to an establishment in 
violation of conscience . . . . When the government declines to impose a tax, by contrast, there is 
no such connection between dissenting taxpayer and alleged establishment.” (citations omitted)). 
 130. Id. at 1444. 
 131. See id. at 1447. 
 132. Flast, 392 U.S. at 98 n.17. 
 133. See id. (noting that if taxpayers were denied standing without exception, “a taxpayer 
would lack standing even if Congress engaged in such palpably unconstitutional conduct as 
providing funds for the construction of churches for particular sects”). 
 134. See id. 
 135. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1457 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The effect of each form of 
subsidy is the same, on the public fisc and on those who contribute to it.”). 
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allowed to challenge this impermissible government support of 
religion. 
However, it seems that the majority in Arizona Christian would 
answer this question differently because of the majority’s clear 
distinction between tax credits and government expenditures: 
taxpayers have standing to challenge government expenditures but 
do not have standing to challenge tax credits.136 Accordingly, a 
taxpayer likely could not challenge a law that provides tax credits to 
those who support building a church because, under Arizona 
Christian, opponents of tax credits do not have standing under the 
Flast exception.137 The distinction lies in how the church receives the 
money, but under either situation the result is essentially the same—
the government financially supports the building of a church.138 This 
hypothetical helps to show possible outcomes after the decision in 
Arizona Christian and why the majority’s reasoning sets a dangerous 
precedent for the future of the Establishment Clause. 
With no taxpayer standing to challenge an alleged Establishment 
Clause violation, such as in Arizona Christian, an alternative method 
is to change the law through the political process139—which is easier 
said than done.140 An informal inquiry of religion in Arizona makes 
this point.141 Religion in Arizona is dominated by Christianity, 
 
 136. Id. at 1447–48 (majority opinion). 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. at 1457 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 139. See id. at 1443 (suggesting that where no “judicial controversy” exists, the matter should 
be pursued through the political process). 
 140. Another interesting alternative is presented by Professor Zelinsky of Harvard. See 
Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits” Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 
112 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380 (1998). Zelinsky suggests a useful alternative to simply 
distinguishing between government expenditures and tax credits in the standing context. Id. at 
400. Instead of this generalized separation of the two categories, he suggests that the two often 
overlap, and that “where others perceive two self-contained categories—tax benefits and direct 
expenditures—[he] see[s] two overlapping bell-shaped curves.” Id. When the two overlap, he 
proposes treating tax credits in a similar manner to expenditures, and he proposes treating them 
differently when they do not overlap. Id. at 381–82. In distinguishing between tax credits and 
direct expenditures, Zelinsky examined them in terms of their permanence, eligibility, and 
quantity. Id. at 400. This method would require a case-by-case analysis to determine when a tax 
credit is similar to a government expenditure. Id. at 382. In doing so, courts would examine the 
nature of a tax credit compared to that of direct expenditure. Id. A case-by-case analysis may be a 
less efficient method, but, as Zelinsky suggests, doing so would still be a superior alternative to 
simply categorizing the two in distinct categories and never allowing standing for tax credit cases. 
See id. at 400. 
 141. See PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY 99 
(2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf. 
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totaling 65 percent of its population, with the next highest religious 
group totaling only 22 percent of the population.142 Given these 
statistics, the religious minority likely cannot win through the 
political process, and the law in Arizona will not change.143 Thus, 
without proper intervention by the Court, the Establishment Clause 
loses significant value because the religious minority that is 
negatively affected by government support of religion cannot 
challenge alleged violations. The Establishment Clause was enacted 
to protect the religious minority—not to protect the majority from 
religion being forced on it.144 For these reasons, it is disconcerting 
that the Court in Arizona Christian disregarded these principles 
through its further limitation of the standing doctrine. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Arizona Christian substantially altered and limited the standing 
exception that the Court created in Flast. Distinguishing between 
governmental expenditures and tax credits allows for governmental 
support of religion by limiting the people who have standing to 
challenge such forms of monetary support. With no taxpayer 
standing to challenge alleged Establishment Clause violations, the 
significance of the right to be free from government-established 
religion is lost. This ruling significantly diminishes First Amendment 
protections and is therefore a step in the wrong direction for this 
country. 
 
 
 
 
 142. Id. These statistics are by no means a formal investigation of Arizona’s religious 
population; rather they serve as a simple example to illustrate this point. See id. at 2. 
 143. See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, An Exercise in Line-Drawing: Deriving and Measuring 
Fairness in Redistricting, 93 GEO. L.J. 1547, 1591 (2005) (explaining how redistricting schemes 
allow states to create districts in order to encourage representation in government by minority 
groups that include racial, ethnic, economic, and religious minorities, because otherwise it would 
be difficult for those minorities to enter into politics). 
 144. Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable Religious Outsider, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1551–52 (2010) (“[O]ne of the Establishment Clause’s main goals is to 
protect the freedom of conscience and equality of religious outsiders.”); Steven B. Epstein, 
Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2171 (1996) 
(“The purpose of the Constitution generally, and the Establishment Clause specifically, is to 
protect minorities from raw majoritarian impulses.”); see also W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects 
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities . . . .”). 
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